The most propitious time for reconciliation in the past 30 years was after 9-11 when Iran telegraphed in many ways its desire to improve relations and contributed to the U.S. victory in Afghanistan in both political and military terms . . . We could have made an ally of Iran instead of intensifying its enmity.
The history of U.S.-Iran relations over the past three decades is a sad tale of mutual grievances and invective and of repeated missed opportunities – sometimes on the Iranian side, more often lately on ours – to reconcile. What engagement has occurred has been tactical, not strategic, plagued by concerns over exposure and how domestic political adversaries would react if they knew talks were taking place.
Frequently, the two sides have been out of sync. When one side appeared ready for authoritative dialogue, the other was not. On the U.S. side, particularly under the Bush administration, there has been a pattern of offering to little, too late.
The most propitious time for reconciliation in the past 30 years was after 9-11 when Iran telegraphed in many ways its desire to improve relations and contributed to the U.S. victory in Afghanistan in both political and military terms. President Bush’s biggest strategic mistake after 9-11 – and he made many -- was to think he could go after multiple enemies instead of focusing on al-Qaeda. We could have made an ally of Iran instead of intensifying its enmity.
Obviously, things have gotten more complicated since Khatami left office. But engagement is possible even with Ahmadinejad in power.
May 1986
A delegation led by President Reagan's former national security adviser, Robert McFarlane, travels to Tehran to deliver spare parts for U.S. anti-aircraft missiles. McFarlane also carries a Bible and a chocolate cake in the shape of a key from a kosher bakery in Tel Aviv. Reagan hopes the scheme will free U.S. hostages in Lebanon and establish ties with Iranian “moderates.” Profits from the sale of the arms are used to fund anti-communist rebels in Nicaragua, in violation of a congressional ban. Iranian radicals leak the story to a Lebanese newspaper. The ensuing Iran-Contra scandal shakes the Reagan administration and leads to the execution of the son-in-law of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s designated successor, Ayatollah Hossein Ali Montazeri. The plan, wrote historian James Bill, "was poorly, clumsily and unprofessionally conceived. It involved the wrong people . . . advised by the wrong 'experts' . . . supported by the wrong allies."1
1989-90
President George H.W. Bush declares in his Inaugural address that "goodwill begets goodwill," strongly implying that the United States will resume relations with Iran if it engineers the release of the last U.S. hostages in Lebanon. Iran ransoms the hostages and in 1990, agrees to meet with the United States in Switzerland. At the last moment, the Iranians pull out. Brent Scowcroft, then White House national security adviser, said later, "My judgment at the time was that the situation in Iran was delicate enough that nobody was prepared to stick his neck out and actually have a conversation with the Great Satan."2
1995-96
The government of Iranian President Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani offers a billion dollar contract to the Conoco oil company to develop two offshore oil fields in what is seen as an olive branch to the new Clinton administration. President Clinton responds by slapping a total embargo on U.S. involvement in Iran's petroleum sector and a year later signs into law the Iran-Libya Sanctions Act, threatening punishment against foreign companies investing in Iranian or Libyan oil or gas production.
1998-2000
Iran's new president, Mohammad Khatami, calls for a "dialogue of civilizations" with the United States to "break down the bulky wall of mistrust" between the two countries.
3 The Clinton administration responds by promoting exchanges of athletes and academics and sends a letter to Khatami via the Saudis offering to begin an authoritative dialogue. The Iranians do not reply. In 1999, the administration eases sanctions on the sale to Iran of U.S. food and medicine and then secretary of State Madeleine Albright outlines a "road map" for better relations. A year later, Albright gives a major speech in which she apologizes for the 1953 CIA coup that re-installed the Shah and for U.S. support for Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war. However, she distinguishes in her remarks between the "elected" Khatami and the "unelected" supreme leader of Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The Iranians reject the overture.
4 November 2001
The Iranians inform a U.S. diplomat that Khatami, planning a visit to the United Nations for a delayed meeting of the General Assembly after the 9-11 attacks, would like to bring a large delegation with him, including experts on al-Qaeda. He also asks to visit Ground Zero to pay his respects to the victims. Neither offer is taken up by the Bush administration.
5 January 2002
James Dobbins, U.S. envoy to Afghan talks, and then Treasury secretary Paul O'Neill are approached by Iranian diplomats at an Afghan donor conference in Tokyo and told that Iran would like to open a broad dialogue with the United States. Both men relay the message to Washington to no apparent effect. A week later, President Bush includes Iran on an "axis of Evil" with Iraq and North Korea.
6March 2002
On the fringes of a multilateral meeting on Afghanistan in Geneva, Dobbins is introduced to an Iranian general who had been in charge of Iran’s military aid to the Northern Alliance, an anti-Taliban Afghan militia. The general tells Dobbins that Iran is willing to contribute to a U.S.-led effort to build a new Afghan army and is prepared to train up to 20,000 troops. Dobbins mentions the offer to then secretary of state Colin Powell, then national security adviser Condoleezza Rice and defense secretary Donald Rumsfeld. "Insofar as I am aware, the issue was never again discussed and the Iranians never received a response," Dobbins said.
7November 2001-May 2003
U.S. and Iranian diplomats meet secretly a dozen times in Europe in talks led by Ryan Crocker and Zalmay Khalilzad, then senior Bush administration officials. The talks initially focus on Afghanistan but later deal with al-Qaeda fugitives, Iranian opposition groups and U.S. preparations for the Iraq war. The talks end after they are publicized and bombings take place in Saudi Arabia that the Bush administration asserts are linked to al-Qaeda detainees in Iran. Iran denies any role.
May 2003
The Swiss transmit an Iranian agenda for talks including all issues of U.S. concern, among them: Iran's nuclear program, support for militant anti-Israel groups and rejection of a two-state solution to the Palestinian question. Powell and White House political aide Karl Rove see the document, authored by Iran's ambassador to France, Sadegh Kharrazi, with help from Swiss ambassador to Iran Tim Guldimann and Mohammad Javad Zarif, an Iranian deputy foreign minister. The Bush administration, feeling triumphant after the toppling of the Iraqi regime, does not reply.
8February-March 2006
Iranian national security adviser Ali Larijani authorizes a deputy, Mohammad Javad Jaffari, to begin backchannel talks with U.S. national security adviser Stephen Hadley. When the overture is unsuccessful, Larijani and Khamenei endorse a previous U.S. proposal for talks just on Iraq. The Bush administration rejects such talks until more than a year later.
9May 2006
Rice offers to join broad multinational negotiations with Iran but only if Iran first suspends its uranium enrichment program. Iran weighs the offer for three months and then rejects it.
May 2008
Iran offers to begin "constructive negotiations" with the United States, the other four permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany on a range of issues, including the nuclear program, terrorism and Middle East peace but continues to refuse to suspend uranium enrichment.
10 The Bush administration and the European powers reply by reiterating the standard demand that Iran must suspend enrichment before serious negotiations can commence.
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