Overview: How to Deal Effectively with Post-crackdown Iran

Iran's hardline rulers continue to suppress internal dissent and consolidate their power.  Meanwhile, nuclear talks with the West are gridlocked.  Iran continues to enrich uranium and is seeking major modifications of a provisional deal reached in October to send the major part of its stockpile of low-enriched uranium overseas.  Iran remains a major player in Iraq and Afghanistan where American troops are at risk.

Here are four keys to dealing effectively with post-crackdown Iran:

1. Pursue a negotiated settlement which places Iran’s nuclear program under a highly intrusive international safeguards and inspections regime while allowing Iran to continue to enrichment on a limited scale.

This is an idea that has not yet been tried.  It is not ideal.  But it is the only approach, at present, that has any reasonable prospect of succeeding. It is too late to keep Iran from learning how to enrich uranium: that capacity was acquired during the Bush Administration with its failed policies of threats and sanctions and refusing to talk.

The central goal for policy now is to ensure that Iran does not take that fateful decision to develop a nuclear weapon, or produce high-enriched uranium or plutonium that might be used in a weapon.

a. Permanently stopping all open and safeguarded enrichment in Iran is clearly desirable, but it may not be achievable, or essential.

Despite the Security Council resolutions ordering Iran to suspend enrichment, Iranians broadly support their leadership in claiming the right under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty to enrich uranium for peaceful use under safeguards. Years of resistance to western pressure have inured Iran's leadership to sanctions and threats, and made standing on Iran’s “right” to enrich for peaceful use practically a symbol of national independence, supported by reformers and hardliners alike.  It is the one thing on which Moussavi and Ahmadinejad agree.

Moreover, open and safeguarded enrichment is not the main risk in any case. Common sense should tell us that any illicit weapons program in Iran is much more likely to follow a clandestine path than to proceed by seizing or diverting material from heavily-monitored facilities that might as well have bulls-eyes painted on them.

b. The key to maximizing our security is getting Iran locked in to a system of comprehensive safeguards and surveillance nationwide.

The measures needed for this purpose have evolved over years and are well-known:

• Iran's ratification of the "Additional Protocol" to Iran's IAEA Safeguards Agreement would give IAEA inspectors greatly expanded access to declared or suspected nuclear sites all across Iran.
• Iran's return to compliance with the revised "Subsidiary Arrangement" would give the IAEA design information and the right to inspect declared or suspected nuclear sites as soon as ground is broken for construction.
• Iran could agree to store and process future stockpiles of low-enriched uranium in a foreign location.
• Iran could accept remote camera surveillance of all declared nuclear facilities.
• Iran could place its enrichment program under the supervision of a multinational consortium.

Such measures are highly intrusive and potentially highly effective. But they also are voluntary under current law, until a nation commits to them.

Moreover, Iran has said in the past that it might accept some or all of these measures in the context of a comprehensive settlement that respects Iran's basic rights to enrich uranium for peaceful use.  If so, that may offer a path forward. The only way to find out if Iran might accept such an arrangement is to propose it.

c. Diplomacy needs time to work.

No one favors tolerating stalling tactics. But an issue as highly-charged and complex as the nuclear one is not going to be resolved in a few months. It is absurd to think otherwise.

Those who say diplomacy has been exhausted are simply mistaken.  Meaningful nuclear diplomacy did not even begin until October 2009, and quickly bogged down when Iran internally divided over an October proposal that Ahmadinejad personally favored and that would have sent much of Iran's stockpile overseas.  That proposal was helpful, but not essential, to a long-term deal.  Iran's acceptance of that proposal should not be made a precondition to further talks to seek the deal that really matters:  Iran's acceptance of intrusive, nationwide inspections that will make us more secure, in exchange for western acceptance of limited enrichment to low levels under tight international supervision in Iran.  Diplomatic exploration of that possible deal has not yet even begun.

As Ambassador Pickering has observed, “Sanctions out of the blue for punishment purposes, as much as I think they deserve it, probably don’t serve any useful purpose in resolving the issue."¹

More on the nuclear issue . . .

2. Promote democracy and freedom in Iran effectively – through self-restraint.

Most outside experts - as well as reformers within Iran -- agree that the best way for the United States to promote freedom and democracy in Iran, if it really wants to, is through self-restraint:

Speak up for democracy and human rights in Iran and elsewhere.  Let the Iranian people know that America stands with them in their brave quest for freedom.  But don't take aggressive actions that give Iranian hardliners a credible external enemy they can use to neutralize dissent and rally public opinion.

Resist the temptation to bankroll dissident groups operating within Iran. U.S. aid will be discovered and will taint any group that receives it and many others besides, just as Soviet funding in the Cold War tainted any American group receiving it and many others besides.

Democracy and freedom cannot be imposed on a country by force, or promoted by stealth. It must grow from within.

More on internal governance and the human rights situation in Iran . . .

3. Open a dialog to pursue common interests in Iraq and Afghanistan.

While Iran pursues its internal disputes, Iraq and Afghanistan hang in the balance and our troops are at risk there.

Iran borders Iraq and Afghanistan and has great influence in both countries. Iran showed in Afghanistan after 9/11 that it can be valuable ally when included as a partner. It has shown in Iraq and the Levant that it can be a thorn in the side when not.

The United States and Iran have strongly overlapping interests in both Iraq and Afghanistan. A solid, self-interested basis for cooperation exists. Including Iran in bilateral or regional consultations could help stabilize Iraq and Afghanistan. It could save U.S. troops' lives. And it could lay a foundation for progress with Iran in other areas.

More on Iran's role in Iraq and Afghanistan . . .

4. Convince Israel that restraint is in its interest; re-energize the Arab-Israeli peace process.

It's not hard to see why Israel is concerned about Iran.  Just look at Ahmadinejad's loathsome questioning of the Holocaust and Iran's persistent support for Hezbollah, Hamas and other militant groups.

But Israel's current proposal for dealing with Iran is a classic example of passions clouding judgment, leading down a path that will undermine the security of both Israel and the United States.

Iran is not an existential threat to Israel if Iran is not attacked.  Even Israel's Defense Minister, Ehud Barak, does not share that exaggerated assessment of the Iranian threat.² Iran's defense spending is a small fraction of Israel's and a tiny fraction of America's.  Iran has not initiated an attack across its borders in over 100 years.  Despite Khamenei's and Ahmadinejad's frequently hostile rhetoric, the history of Iran's actions makes crystal clear that Iran's foreign policy goals focus on preserving the state and increasing its regional influence -- not some messianic quest for martyrdom in the service of Islam.

An Israeli attack on Iran's nuclear facilities would be ill-advised and counter-productive, increasing the threat to Israel rather than reducing it.  Absent any evidence in word or deed that Iran is preparing to attack Israel, an Israeli attack on Iran would trample international law and isolate the United States and Israel (not Iran) in world opinion.  It would entrench hardliners in power in Iran and unify the Iranian people against the United States and Israel for a long time to come.  It also would very likely spread chaos in the region, putting American troops at risk in Iraq and Afghanistan where Iran wields great influence, and triggering attacks on Israeli soldiers and civilians by Iranian proxies in Lebanon and Gaza.

By contrast, direct U.S. diplomacy with Iran, handled correctly, could help defuse the nuclear standoff and create incentives for Iran to steer Hamas and Hezbollah towards political, not military, solutions. This would greatly strengthen Israel's national security.

More on the Iran-Israel conflict.

Conclusion

After many years of mutual hostility, no one should expect that engaging Iran will be easy. It certainly won't be quick. The recent crackdown will make it much more difficult, and perhaps impossible. But past policies based on threats and sanctions clearly have not worked. Diplomacy, even under the present circumstances, has a much greater chance of success.