Uranium Metal and Alleged Studies Worksheet

On August 27, 2007 the IAEA and Iran agreed upon a workplan for addressing allegations surrounding two sets of documents that suggest that Iran had run a covert nuclear weapons research program for years.  One document is the so-called "Uranium Metal" document.  The other documents -- collectively known as the "alleged studies" -- were produced by western intelligence agencies in late 2005.

This worksheet reviews the course of discussions between the IAEA and Iran over these documents, drawing on the words of the IAEA itself.  The date at the beginning of each entry corresponds to the date of the IAEA report in question.  Thee paragraph numbers at the beginning of most paragraphs correspond to the paragraph number in the IAEA report itsefl.  The reports may be conveniently accessed under the "Documents and Reports" tab of the IAEA's Iran in Focus website.

Uranium metal document

2/22/08
On 8 November 2007, the Agency received a copy from Iran of the 15-page document  describing the procedures for the reduction of UF6 to uranium metal and the machining of enriched  uranium metal into hemispheres, which are components of nuclear weapons. Iran reiterated that this  document had been received along with the P-1 centrifuge documentation in 1987 and that it had not  been requested by Iran. The Agency is still waiting for a response from Pakistan on the circumstances  of the delivery of this document in order to understand the full scope and content of the offer made by  the network in 1987 (GOV/2006/15, paras 20–22).

9/15/08
19. As indicated in the Director General’s report to the Board in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, para. 19), Iran has said that it is unable to provide any additional clarification of the circumstances related to the acquisition of the uranium metal document, reiterating that the document in question had been received along with the P-1 documentation, and that it had not been requested by Iran.

Alleged Studies

IAEA position

02/22/08
35. The Agency has continued to urge Iran, as demanded by the Security Council, to address the alleged studies concerning the conversion of uranium dioxide (UO2) into uranium tetrafluoride (UF4)  (the green salt project), high explosives testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle, which could have a military nuclear dimension and which appear to have administrative interconnections, and in view of their possible link to nuclear material (GOV/2007/58, para. 28).

5/26/08
16. [The information in the alleged studies] was provided to the Agency by several Member States, appears to have been derived from multiple sources over different periods of time, is detailed in content, and appears to be generally consistent.

17(a). In connection with the alleged studies in general, the Agency requested that Iran identify and clarify those elements of the documentation which it considered to be factually correct, and to specify those aspects considered by Iran to have been fabricated.

24. It should be noted that the Agency currently has no information – apart from the uranium metal document – on the actual design or manufacture by Iran of nuclear material components of a nuclear weapon or of certain other key components, such as initiators, or on related nuclear physics studies.

9/15/08
The Agency emphasized that the documentation was  sufficiently comprehensive and detailed5 that it needed to be taken seriously, particularly in light of the  fact that, as acknowledged by Iran, some of the information contained in it was factually accurate.

Iran's Position

5/26/08
18. On 14 May 2008, Iran provided in writing its overall assessment of the documents presented to it by the Agency. Iran stated that the documents “do not show any indication that the Islamic Republic of Iran has been working on [a] nuclear weapon.” Iran also stated that the documents were not authentic, that they were “forged” or “fabricated”. Iran did not dispute that some of the information contained in the documents was factually accurate, but said the events and activities concerned involved civil or conventional military applications. Iran said the documents contained numerous inconsistencies and many were based on publicly available information. Iran stated that “the Islamic Republic of Iran has not had and shall not have any nuclear weapon program.”

9/15/2008
15. . . . Iran also expressed concern that the resolution of some of these issues would require Agency access to sensitive information related to its conventional military and missile-related activities. Note: Iran reiterated these concerns in a letter to the Director General dated 5 September 2008.

Meetings and Discussions Held; Responses received 

During a meeting in Tehran on 21–22 April 2008, Iran agreed to address the alleged studies, the procurement and R&D activities of military related institutes and companies, and questions which had been raised in the Agency’s letters of 8 February and 12 February 2008 (GOV/2008/4 para. 38) (See Annex, Section B.1).On 9 May 2008, the Agency submitted a request for additional clarifications relevant to the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme (see Annex, Section B.2). Iran provided its response to these questions on 23 May 2008, which is being assessed by the Agency.

5/26/08
16. At follow up meetings in Tehran on 28–30 April and 13–14 May 2008, the Agency presented, for review by Iran, information related to the alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project (See Annex, Section A). This included information which Iran had declined to review in February 2008 (GOV/2008/4, paras 35, 37–39 and 42).

9/15/2008
15. . . . in a series of meetings in April and May 2008,  the Agency held discussions with Iran on these matters, and sought additional clarifications relevant to  the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme. Iran provided written replies on 14 and 23 May 2008, the  former of which included a 117-page presentation responding to the allegations concerning the green  salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project.

16. After further assessment of Iran’s responses, the Agency, in a series of meetings held in Tehran on 7–8 and 18–20 August 2008, highlighted areas where additional information was necessary.

11/19/2008
Unfortunately,  Iran has not offered any cooperation with the Agency since that report and has not yet provided the  requested information, or access to the requested documentation, locations or individuals.

6/5/2009
18. In a letter to Iran dated 29 May 2009, the Agency responded to Iran’s letters dated  16 September 2008, 28 November 2008 and 2 March 2009, in which Iran had, inter alia, provided its  views on a number of issues referred to in the Director General’s reports and questioned the  correctness of certain statements contained in the reports attributed to Iran in connection with possible  military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme and statements in relation to the resolution of the  issues contained in the Work Plan. In its letter, the Agency explained why the statements in the  Director General’s reports were correct. The Agency also reiterated its request to meet with relevant  Iranian authorities at the earliest possible opportunity, with a view to addressing in a substantive and  comprehensive manner the issues that remain outstanding. The Agency has still not received a positive reply from Iran in connection with the Agency’s requests for access to relevant information, documentation, locations or individuals.

On whether documentation has been given/shown to Iran

02/22/08
The Agency was able to show some relevant documentation [relevant to green salt program, high-explosives testing and missile re-entry] to Iran on 3–5  February 2008 and is still examining the allegations made and the statements provided by Iran in  response. Iran has maintained that these allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.  The Agency’s overall assessment requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal  document, and clarifications concerning the procurement activities of some military related institutions  still not provided by Iran. The Agency only received authorization to show some further material to  Iran on 15 February 2008. Iran has not yet responded to the Agency’s request of that same date for Iran to view this additional documentation on the alleged studies. In light of the above, the Agency is  not yet in a position to determine the full nature of Iran’s nuclear programme

5/26/08
16. The Agency received much of this information [relating to green salt, high explosives testing and missile -re-entry vehicle] only in electronic form and was not authorised to provide copies to Iran.

9/15/08
15. . . . [Iran] reiterated that, although it had been shown electronic versions of  the documentation, Iran had not received copies of the documentation to enable it to prove that they  were forged and fabricated.

IAEA's Assessment of Iran's Level of Cooperation with Investigation of Alleged Studies

5/26/08
23. In light of the discussion on 14 May 2008, the Agency is of the view that Iran may have additional information, in particular on high explosives testing and missile related activities,  . . .

27. The alleged studies on the green salt project, high explosives testing and the missile re-entry vehicle project remain a matter of serious concern. Clarification of these is critical to an assessment of the nature of Iran’s past and present nuclear programme. Iran has agreed to address the alleged studies. However, it maintains that all the allegations are baseless and that the data have been fabricated.

28. The Agency’s overall assessment of the nature of Iran’s nuclear programme also requires, inter alia, an understanding of the role of the uranium metal document, and clarifications by Iran concerning some procurement activities of military related institutions, which remain outstanding. Substantive explanations are required from Iran to support its statements on the alleged studies and on other information with a possible military dimension. Iran’s responses to the Agency’s letter of 9 May 2008 were not received until 23 May 2008 and could not yet be assessed by the Agency.

9/15/08
18. The Agency believes that Iran could, as a matter of transparency, assist the Agency in its  assessment of the alleged studies by providing it with access to documents, information and personnel  to demonstrate, as Iran asserts, that these activities were not nuclear related. Unfortunately, Iran has  not yet provided the requested information, or access to the requested documentation, locations or  individuals.

23. The Agency, regrettably, has not been able to make any substantive progress on the alleged  studies and other associated key remaining issues which remain of serious concern. For the Agency to  make progress, an important first step, in connection with the alleged studies, is for Iran to clarify the  extent to which information contained in the relevant documentation is factually correct and where, in  its view, such information may have been modified or relates to alternative, non-nuclear purposes. Iran  needs to provide the Agency with substantive information to support its statements and provide access  to relevant documentation and individuals in this regard.

List of Specific Alleged Studies: [principal studies of concern are listed in 5/26/08 para. 17]

1.  Documents purporting to show that Iran had been working on a capability to convert uranium dioxide to UF4 (Green Salt)

2.  Documents suggesting work on development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators including, inter alia, the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators.

3. Technical reports purportedly related to efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle of the sort that might be used to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

4.  Documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead

5. Documents indicating the testing of at least one full scale hemispherical, converging, explosively driven shock system that could be applicable to an implosion-type nuclear device.

6.  Alleged involvement of military entitities in apparently-nuclear-related activity

1.  Green Salt Document

Description of green salt documents

Document 1: A one page undated flowsheet purportedly originating from the Kimia Maadan Company (KM), which shows a process of bench scale conversion of UO2 to UF4 with a capacity of 1 tonne per year of UF4. The document is entitled “Process Flow Diagram – Green Salt Production – Bench Scale”, bears the words “Kimia Maadan Group” and “Project 5/13”5, and includes a detailed legend of equipment and material balance information.[5/26/08]

Document 2: A one page annotated letter of May 2003 in Farsi from an engineering company to KM requesting instructions regarding the supply of a programmable logic control (PLC) system.[5/26/08]

Key Agency Statements on green salt document:

02/22/08
37.  The Agency showed Iran certain documentation which the Agency had been given by other Member States, purportedly originating from Iran, including a flowsheet of bench scale conversion of  UO2 to UF4. The documents show a capacity of the process of about 1 tonne per year of UF4. The flowsheet has KM markings on it and refers to “Project 5/13.” The documentation includes communications between the project staff and another private company on the acquisition of process  instrumentation. These communications also make reference to the leadership of the project  concerning the missile re-entry vehicle. The Agency also presented a sketch of a process to produce 50 tonnes of UF4 per year.

9/15/08
17(b). In connection with the alleged green salt project, the Agency requested access to the originals of the letters and contracts involving Kimia Maadan, which Iran has acknowledged exist, and copies of some of which Iran has provided to the Agency, with a view to resolving some inconsistencies identified by the Agency in the supporting document provided by Iran. The Agency has also requested access to individuals named in the documentation.

Iran response on green salt document

02/22/08
38. Iran stated that the allegations were baseless and that the information which the Agency had  shown to Iran was fabricated. However, Iran agreed to clarify its statement in detail. On 8 February  and 12 February 2008, the Agency reiterated in writing its request for additional clarifications. On  14 February 2008, Iran responded, reiterating its earlier statements and declaring that this was its final  assessment on this point. Iran stated that the only organization that had been, and was, involved in fuel  cycle activities was the AEOI and that the AEOI had had a contract with KM to develop a UOC plant  in Gchine, which was the only project in which KM was ever involved. In Iran’s view, the flowsheet  was a fabrication and the accusation baseless.

5/26/08
19. Iran said it would not have made sense to launch such a project as it had already acquired the necessary technology for UCF.

2.  Documents suggesting work on development and testing of high voltage detonator firing equipment and exploding bridgewire (EBW) detonators including, inter alia, the simultaneous firing of multiple EBW detonators

Description of documents

Document 1: “Analysis and Review of Exploding Bridgewire (EBW) Detonator Test Results” dated  January–February 2004, comprising 11 pages in Farsi reporting on work carried out by “Project 3.12”  to design and construct an EBW detonator and a suitable detonator firing unit, including testing of about 500 EBW detonators. [5/26/08]

Document 2: One page undated document in Farsi providing text and a schematic diagram for an  underground testing arrangement. The diagram depicts a 400m deep shaft located 10km from a firing control point and shows the placement of various electronic systems such as a control unit and a high  voltage power generator. [5/26/08]

Document 3: Five page document in English describing experimentation undertaken with a complex multipoint initiation system to detonate a substantial amount of high explosive in hemispherical  geometry and to monitor the development of the detonation wave in that high explosive using a considerable number of diagnostic probes. [5/26/08]

Agency position on high-explosive testing documents

9/15/08
17(c). In connection with the alleged studies in high explosives testing, the Agency has asked Iran to provide additional information and documentation, and access to individuals, in support of its statements about the civil and conventional military applications of its work in the area of EBW detonators (GOV/2008/15, para. 20).

Iran response to concerns about high-explosive testing documents

02/22/08
39. Iran stated that the documents were fabricated and that the information contained in those documents could easily be found in open sources.

5/26/08
20. Iran acknowledged that it had conducted simultaneous testing with two to three EBW detonators with a time precision of about one microsecond. Iran said, however, that this was intended for civil and conventional military applications. Iran further stated, inter alia, that there was no evidence in the documents presented to it to link them to Iran.

3. Technical reports purportedly related to efforts to engineer a new payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle of the sort that might be used to accommodate a nuclear warhead.

Description of documents

Document 1: Comprised of four presentations in Farsi providing an overview of “Project 111” from some time before December 2002 to January 2004. The documents detail various aspects of an  unidentified entity’s effort to develop and construct a Shahab-3 re-entry vehicle capable of housing a  new payload for the Shahab-3 missile system. The material includes a short film clip on the assembly of a dummy re-entry vehicle payload chamber.

Document 2: “Instructions for Assembling the Chamber Parts, Assembling the Payload Inside the  Chamber, and Assembling the Chamber to Shahab-3 Warhead”, 18 pages in Farsi, dated December  2003–January 2004, produced by Group E6 of Project 111. 

Document 3: “Explosive Control System. Construction and Design Report”, 48 pages in Farsi, dated  December 2003–January 2004, produced by Project 111.

Document 4: “Assembly and Operating Guidelines for Explosive Control System”, 17 pages in  Farsi, dated December 2003–January 2004, produced by the Groups E2 and E3 of Project 111.

Document 5: “Design and Construction of Explosive Control System”, 29 pages in Farsi, dated  December 2003–January 2004, produced by Groups E2 and E3 of Project 111.

Document 6: “Finite Element Simulation and Transient Dynamic Analysis of the Warhead  Structure”, 39 pages in Farsi, dated February–March 2003, produced by Group E5 of Project 111.

Document 7: “Implementation of Mass Properties Requirements of Shahab-3 Missile Warhead with  New Payload, with the Use of Nonlinear Optimization Method”, 36 pages in Farsi, dated March–April  2003, produced by Group E4 of Project 111. more

IAEA Position on missile warhead-related documents

02/22/08
39. During the meetings mentioned above [Jan and Feb. 2008], the Agency also described  parameters and development work related to the Shahab 3 missile, in particular technical aspects of a  re-entry vehicle, and made available to Iran for examination a computer image provided by other  Member States showing a schematic layout of the contents of the inner cone of a re-entry vehicle. This layout has been assessed by the Agency as quite likely to be able to accommodate a nuclear device.

09/15/08
17.(e) Some important parameters reflected in the documentation relating to the re-design of the  payload chamber for the Shahab-3 missile re-entry vehicle are the same as those reflected in  the documentation referred to in paragraphs (c) and (d) above (e.g. dimensions). The Agency  proposed discussions with Iranian experts on the contents of the engineering reports  examining in detail modelling studies related to the effects of various physical parameters on  the re-entry body from time of launch of the missile to payload detonation. The discussions  would be aimed at ascertaining whether these studies were associated with nuclear related  activities or, as Iran has asserted, related only to conventional military activities. In addition,  the Agency requested access to three civilian workshops identified in the documentation.

Iran Response to concerns about missile-warhead-related documents:

02/22/08
Iran stated that its missile programme involved the use of conventional warheads only and was also  part of the country’s space programme, and that the schematic layout shown by the Agency was  baseless and fabricated.

5/26/08
22. Iran stated that the files were in electronic form and could therefore have been easily manipulated. Iran also stated, inter alia, that the documents were not complete and that the report structures varied, which raised serious doubts about their authenticity.

4.  Documents purporting to show administrative interconnections between the alleged green salt project and a project to modify the Shahab-3 missile to carry a nuclear warhead

Iran Response:

5/26/08
21. Iran stated that, since some of the documents were not shown to it by the Agency, it could not make an assessment of them. Although the Agency had been shown the documents that led it to these conclusions, it was not in possession of the documents and was therefore unfortunately unable to make them available to Iran.

Iran Response

Iran has stated that there have been no such activities in Iran.

Agency Position

09/15/08
Since the Director General’s previous report, the Agency has obtained information indicating that the experimentation described in this document may have involved the assistance of foreign expertise. Iran has been informed of the details of this information and has been asked to clarify this matter.

6.  Alleged Involvement of military entities in apparently nuclear-related activity

Key IAEA statements

02/22/08
40. During the meetings of 27–28 January and 3–5 February 2008, the Agency asked Iran to clarify a number of procurement actions by the ERI, PHRC and IAP which could relate to the above-mentioned alleged studies. These included training courses on neutron calculations, the effect of shock waves on metal, enrichment/isotope separation and ballistic missiles. Efforts to procure spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources, special steel parts (GOV/2006/15, para. 37) and radiation measurement equipment, including borehole gamma spectrometers, were also made.

41. During the same meetings, the Agency requested clarification of the roles of certain officials and institutes and their relation to nuclear activities. Iran was also asked to clarify projects such as the so-called “Project 4” (possibly uranium enrichment) and laser related R&D activities.

9/15/08
20. The Agency is still awaiting responses to a number of procurement related questions which may shed light, inter alia, on the role of the military related entities and their staff in the procurement of  items for Iran’s nuclear programme and related technical activities in support of that programme.

Iran Response to concerns on involvement of military entities in nuclear-related work:

02/22/08
[With regard to the allegations in para. 40 above] Iran denied the existence of some of the organizations and project offices referred to in the documentation and denied  that other organizations named were involved in nuclear related activities.[Also], in its written response on 5 February 2008, Iran stated that ‘PAM shock’ software was enquired about “in order to study aircraft, collision of cars, airbags and for the design of safety belts.” Iran also stated that the radiation monitors it had enquired about were meant to be used for radiation protection purposes.  Iran’s response regarding the efforts to procure training courses on neutron calculations, and enrichment/isotope separation, spark gaps, shock wave software, neutron sources and radiation measurement equipment for borehole gamma spectrometers is still awaited.

[With regard to the allegations in par. 41 above] Iran also denied the existence of some of the people named in the documentation and said allegations about the roles of other people named were baseless. Iran’s response to the Agency’s request regarding “Project 4” and laser related R&D activities is still awaited

9/15/08
20. . . . With regard to the production of nuclear related components by companies related to defence industries,  Iran’s response of 23 May 2008 did not provide any new information. Iran has thus far declined to address these issues as, in its opinion, such issues should be addressed as a routine safeguards matter, and only after the issue of the alleged studies has been resolved.